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Abstract 
An architecture is presented for combining rule-based and case-based reasoning. The architecture 
is intended for domains that are understood reasonably well, but still imperfectly. It uses a set 
of rules, which are taken to be only approximately correct, to obtain a preliminary answer for a 
given problem; it then draws analogies from cases to handle exceptions to the rules. Having rules 
together with cases not only increases the architecture’s domain coverage, it also allows innovative 
ways of doing case-based reasoning: the same rules that are used for rule-based reasoning are also 
used by the case-based component to do case indexing and case adaptation. The architecture was 
applied to the task of name pronunciation, and, with minimal knowledge ngineering, was found 
to perform almost at the level of the best commercial systems. Moreover, its accuracy was found 
to exceed what it could have achieved with rules or cases alone, thus demonstrating the accuracy 
improvement afforded by combining rule-based and case-based reasoning. 
1. Intmduction 
Domains vary in the degree to which they are understood, ranging from those that 
have been codified completely and correctly in terms of a set of rules of behavior, to 
those for which no such rules are known. This paper is concerned with domains that 
fall between these two extremes, but closer to the “well-understood” end-domains for 
which a set of rules is known, but the rules do not cover the full complexities of the 
domain. The rules must also be able to be run efficiently. In such domains, rules and 
cases both provide valuable knowledge. While the rules embody the understanding that 
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has been codified over the years by experts, cases contain knowledge of the domain in 
a more unprocessed form-illustrations of actual behaviors that occur in the domain, 
complete with idiosyncrasies and irregularities. Neither source subsumes the other-the 
codified knowledge in the rules is not necessarily well represented by any given set 
of cases, while the idiosyncratic knowledge in the cases is not necessarily captured 
by known rules. This observation is the basis for the architecture presented here for 
combining rule-based reasoning (RBR) 1 171 and case-based reasoning (CBR) [ 20,301. 
The architecture uses a set of rules, which arc taken to be only approximately correct, 
to obtain a preliminary answer for a given problem; it then draws analogies from cases 
to handle exceptions to the rules. 
Having rules together with the cases not only allows the architecture to take advan- 
tage of more domain knowledge. it also allows innovations in CBR technology. The 
architecture incorporates two novel methods for CBR that are based on exploiting the 
rules of the RBR component. First, the rules are used to index the cases. The index- 
ing scheme, termed prediction-based indexing, hangs cases directly off the rules, using 
the rule antecedents to supply appropriate cues for case retrieval. This avoids having 
to analyze the domain to identify a suitable vocabulary of direct and derived indexing 
features; instead, it takes advantage of the domain structure implicit in the rules, and 
hence already available. The second role of the rules in CBR is for case adaptation, via 
a strategy of “case adaptation by factoring”. The rules are used to factor each source 
case into the individual steps that were applied within the case, through a process of 
rational reconstruction. The individual steps are then sufficiently fine grained that the 
relevant ones can be transferred verbatim from source to target, despite overall dispar- 
ities between the cases. Factoring is thus a way of adapting the source case to enable 
transfer to globally dissimilar target cases. 
To test the architecture for a real-world task. it was applied to the problem of name 
pronunciation. With minimal knowledge engineering, the resulting system, Anapron, ’ 
was found to perform almost at the level of the best commercial name-pronunciation 
systems, and substantially better than other machine-learning systems applied to this 
task (two versions of NETtalk). Moreover. Anapron’s accuracy was found to exceed 
what it could have achieved with rules or cases alone, thus demonstrating the accuracy 
improvement afforded by combining rule-based and case-based reasoning. 
The next section presents the architecture, independent of the domain of name pronun- 
ciation. The Anapron system. which instantiates the architecture for name pronunciation, 
is then described. A set of experiments on Anapron are presented, the key result being 
an empirical demonstration of the improvement obtained by combining rules and cases. 
The last two sections discuss related work. and conclude. 
2. The architecture 
The architecture is organized as a set of modules that can be configured according to 
the needs of the domain; see Fig. I The minimal configuration consists of four modules, 
’ Anapron stands for Rrrulogical prmunciatlon system 
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Fig. 1. Anatomy of the architecture. The black outer ectangle represents he overall architecture for combining 
RBR and CBR; the gray inner rectangle ncloses the core method. Boxes represent modules of the architecture, 
and icons stand for knowledge structures. Links indicate dependencies between components. 
collectively termed the core method, shown in the diagram enclosed in the gray inner 
rectangle. These four modules are the heart of the architecture-they implement the 
method for combining RBR and CBR. The remaining three modules, termed the support 
modules, perform various roles in acquiring the knowledge needed by the core method. 
Each of these modules may be included, on a domain-by-domain basis, as needed to 
make up the difference between the knowledge needed by the core method and the 
knowledge that is already available in the domain. 
The sections below describe the core method of the architecture and the support 
modules, followed by a discussion of design issues. For ease of exposition, examples will 
be drawn from a toy (but implemented) domain; the instantiation to name pronunciation 
is deferred to Section 3. 
Procedure RC-Hybrid(pmhlm) 
(a) RBR: Use the rules to select an operator to apply. 
( h 1 CBR: Look for analogles that contradict the operator suggested by RBR. 
(c) Combination: Decide between the operators suggested by RBR and CBR 
Fig. 2. Top-level procedure l’ur combming rule-based and case-based reasoning. 
2.1. The cm-e ruethad 
The core method is the heart of the architecture; it is the part that solves problems 
by a combination of RBR and CBR. The central idea is to apply the rules to the target 
problem to get an approximate answer, and to draw analogies from cases to cover 
exceptions to the rules. This idea is expressed in the RC-Hybrid procedure of Fig. 2. 
The procedure treats problem solving as a process of applying operators to the target 
problem until it is solved. The procedure applies one operator on each iteration. It 
chooses the operator in three steps. First it selects an operator to apply via the rules. 
It then looks for analogies that contradict the rules and suggest alternative operators. ln 
the combination step, it decides which operator to actually apply-the one suggested 
by RBR or one suggested by CBR. Underlying this strategy of starting with the rules 
and line tuning with the cases is the assumption that a reasonably fast and accurate set 
of rules is available. If not, a different architecture may be called for, such as one that 
applies CBR and RBR in the opposite order. 
The core method gets its domain knowledge from four sources: a weak theory of the 
domain. a case library, a similarity metric, and a set of thresholds. The weak theory is a 
method for solving problems in the domain using a set of rules. It has two components: 
the rules themselves, and a set of operators. The operators define the legal actions in the 
domain. Each operator may have an associated applicability condition that limits the set 
of states in which it can be applied. The rules provide search control, specifying exactly 
one operator to apply in every problem-solving state. A weak theory is weak in the 
sense that it does not always suggest the right operator to apply-if it did, there would 
be no reason to apply the architecture in the first place. In fact, even if the weak theory 
does not contuirr the right operator to apply, the architecture may be able to recover 
by applying theory extension. which detects such missing operators by noticing failures 
of the weak theory to account for examples in the case library, and which invents new 
operators (and rules) to correct the failures (see Section 2.2.2). 
As an example of a weak theory, consider a toy version of a problem in auto insurance: 
to assess the risk of insuring a new client. Solving a problem in this domain consists of 
three steps: determining whether the client is an attentive driver, determining whether 
he2 is in a hostile driving environment, and, based on the previous inferences, assessing 
his level of risk. Each step is implemented by applying one of a corresponding set of 
operators. For example, the first step-determining whether the client, c, is an attentive 
driver-is implemented by applying either the attentive or inattentive operator. 
2 Masculine pronouns are mtendcd in the gcnrrlc XXIX unlc\~ the context indicates otherwise 
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Operators 
attentive 
high-risk 
inattentive 
< 
endangered 
neutral 
< medium-risk 
low-risk 
If occupation( c) = student then attentive ; ‘Student’ rule 
elseif sex(c) = M and age(c) < 30 then inattentive ; ‘Young driver’ rule 
elseif age(c) 2 65 then inattentive ; ‘Old driver’ rule 
else attentive ; ‘Default’ rule 
If address2( c) = New York, NY 
or address2(c) = Los Angeles, CA then endangered 
else neutral 
If inattentive(c) and endangered(c) then high-risk 
elseif inattentive(c) or endangered(c) then medium-risk 
else low-risk 
; ‘Hostile traffic’ rule 
; ‘Normal traffic’ rule 
; ‘High’ rule 
; ‘Medium’ rule 
; ‘Low’ rule 
Fig. 3. Weak theory for the toy auto-insurance example. The less-than signs (<) between operators represent 
applicability conditions that control the order in which the operators are applied. The letter c in the rules 
stands for a client. 
The former adds the assertion attentive(c) to the state, while the latter adds the opposite 
assertion. Applicability conditions control the order in which operators are applied; for 
example, attentive and inattentive are constrained to apply only in the initial state. 
The weak theory is summarized in Fig. 3. 
The next knowledge source needed by the core method is the case library. It is a 
collection of cases, where a case consists of a problem, its answer, and the chain of 
operators by which the answer was derived. In the insurance domain, a case translates 
into a client, the client’s level of risk, and the operators that derived that level of risk 
for that client. The client is represented as a feature vector. Fig. 4 gives an example of 
Target Case # 1 Case # 6 
Name 
Address 1 
Address2 
Sex 
Age 
Occupation 
Car-make 
Car-value 
Smith 
Sigma Chi House 
Stanford, CA 
M 
21 
student 
Chevrolet 
2,500 
Johnson 
Sigma Chi House 
Stanford, CA 
M 
19 
student 
BMW 
30,000 
Davis 
Toyon Hall 
Stanford, CA 
F 
22 
student 
Toyota 
3,000 
Answer medium-risk(Johnson) low-risk(Davis) 
Operators inattentive, attentive, 
neutral, neutral, 
medium-risk low-risk 
Fig. 4. A target problem and selected cases from the insurance example. 
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Procedure Index (msc) 
- 
Until (YI.FP is solved do- 
(a) Use The rules to predict which operator (jr should apply to cask. Ler r be the rule that made 
Ihe prediction. 
(b) Compare o,, wnh the operator (I,, Ihal i< observed 10 have been applied to UI.W 
(c) If the IWO operators arc the same. sturc the case as a positive exemplar of rule r. else as a 
negative exemplar. 
Cd) Proceed to apply operator II<, 10 WSE. 
- 
Fig 3. Procedure for Indexing 3 case 
a problem and two cases in this domain. The full case library in this toy example has 
30 cases. 
The last two knowledge structures required by the core method are the similarity 
metric and thresholds. The similarity metric estimates how similar two problems are 
with respect to the application of a particular operator. The thresholds are used by the 
combination module in deciding whether an analogy should override the rules. These 
are both discussed further below. 
The individual modules in the core method are presented in the following sections. 
2. I. I. ldexing 
The purpose of the indexing module is to organize the cases to make them accessible 
later for CBR. CBR will use the cases to critique RBR; cases are therefore viewed as 
evidence for or against the rules. A case constitutes evidencefor a rule if it illustrates a 
place where the rule makes a correct prediction. It constitutes evidence against a rule if 
it illustrates a place where the rule makes an incorrect prediction. The indexing module 
stores the case as a positive or negative exemplur of the rule accordingly. 
The complete indexing procedure for a case is shown in Fig. 5. It applies RBR to 
the case as if it were a new problem. Step ic) does the actual indexing: it stores the 
case as a positive or negative exemplar of each rule that was predicted to apply to it. 
Step (d) completes one iteration of the procedure by applying an operator to the case. It 
applies oO. the observed operator, so that when the rules make their next prediction (in 
step (a) ). it will be based on how the case was actually solved, not on how the rules 
would have solved it. Applying the predicted operator, oP, would be incorrect, because 
then if the rules predict one wrong operator at the beginning, all of their subsequent 
predictions that are based on this initial wrong operator will be thrown off as well. 
Once all of the cases have been indexed as described, they can be used as source 
exemplars for analogies. The indexed cases will also be used to help in judging analogical 
compellingness (see Section 2. I .4). 
Given that the rules are not expected to be perfect, one may ask how this indexing 
scheme performs in the face of rule inaccuracies. Consider the situation where the 
architecture is presented with a target problem, and the case library contains a source 
problem that is similar to the target and has the same behavior. Will the indexing scheme 
be able to retrieve this source? The answer is yes, regardless of rule inaccuracies, as 
long as the rules fire the same way for the source and target problems. This is likely, 
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‘Student’ rule ‘Normal traffic’ rule ‘Medium’ rule 
A A A 
Positive Negative Positive Negative Positive Negative -- - - - - 
Johnson Johnson Johnson 
Fig. 6. Results of applying PBI to client Johnson. Johnson is stored as a positive or negative exemplar of each 
of the three rules that make a prediction for him. 
given that the source and target are similar; the only way for the rules to differentiate 
between them is to test a property that is both irrelevant to their behavior and not shared 
between them. Thus if the rules handle the source correctly, they will file it under the 
right rules, and retrieve it when these rules fire again for the target problem. If the rules 
handle the source incorrectly, they will file it under the wrong rules, and retrieve it when 
these same wrong rules fire for the target problem. In effect, the rules act as a hashing 
function, distributing exemplars into behavior classes based on (weak) knowledge of 
the domain. 
The indexing scheme just presented is termed prediction-based indexing (PBI) be- 
cause it indexes cases by the rules that predicted which operators should apply- 
regardless of whether the predictions were correct. Equivalently, it can be thought of as 
indexing cases by whatever features the rules looked at in order to make their predic- 
tions. This is related to explanation-based indexing (EBI) [ 31; however, there the rules 
are used to explain an observed outcome, rather than to make their own prediction of the 
outcome. This difference results in quite distinct modes of operation in the two schemes. 
EBI needs to account for any observed answer, and thus works backward from the an- 
swer using correct rule applications. It prefers a theory that is as broad as possible-one 
that can even account for multiple answers to the same problem (rendering the rules 
nondeterministic). PBI, on the other hand, applies the rules in the forward direction, 
allowing both correct and incorrect rule applications. It uses the same rules as for ordi- 
nary rule-based reasoning, rather than requiring one set for explaining answers and one 
set for performance. It prefers a theory that is as accurate as possible, to minimize the 
amount of work the architecture will have to do later to override wrong rule applications 
via CBR. 
Example. As an illustration of PBI, consider again the toy auto-insurance example. 
PBI applies to the first client in the case library, Johnson, in three iterations. The re- 
sults are shown in Fig. 6. On the first iteration, the rules are applied, and the ‘student’ 
rule fires. It predicts the attentive operator for Johnson. This differs from the op- 
erator specified in the case, inattentive. Johnson is therefore stored as a negative 
exemplar of the ‘student’ rule. The indexing procedure proceeds to apply the observed 
operator, inattentive, to Johnson. On the second iteration, the ‘normal traffic’ rule 
predicts neutral, which agrees with the operator given in the case. Johnson is made a 
positive exemplar of the ‘normal traffic’ rule. On the last iteration, the ‘medium’ rule 
correctly predicts the operator medium-risk, based on the assertions of the previous 
two operators. Johnson is therefore stored as a positive exemplar of the ‘medium’ rule. 
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2.1.2. RBR 
Rule-based reasoning matches the rules against the target problem. Rules can match 
any attribute of the problem-solvin g state. including assertions added by previous prob- 
lem solving. Rule matching corresponds to step (a) of procedure RC-Hybrid. The 
matching rule is not actually applied at this point, but rather is taken as a provisional 
I-& that will only be applied later if not overridden by CBR. 
Example. Continuing with the insurance example, suppose the target problem is to 
evaluate the risk of insuring client Smith isee Fig. 4). On the first iteration of procedure 
RC-Hybrid, the ‘student’ rule matches and is selected as the provisional rule. 
2.1.3. CBR 
The CBR module acts as a critic of the RBR module. It corresponds to step (b) of 
procedure RC-Hybrid. It tries to show that the target problem is an exception of the 
provisional rule by looking for an analogy between the target problem and a negative 
exemplar of the rule. The negative exemplars of the rule are available in a list hanging off 
the rule-this was arranged by the indexing scheme. The CBR module goes down this 
list, proposing analogies one at a time, until it runs out of exemplars, or the combination 
module judges one of the analogies to be compelling.’ 
The actual proposing of analogies is done by applying the similarity metric. The 
metric takes three arguments: a source problem, a target problem, and an operator- 
to-be-transferred from source to target. Here the source problem will be a negative 
exemplar, and the operator-to-be-transferred will be the operator that was applied to this 
exemplar. The operator establishes a context for comparing the problems. Given these 
three arguments, the metric returns two values: a numerical rating of the similarity, called 
the similari~ score; and the implicit rule behind the analogy, called the atzalogical rule 
or at-de. The implicit rule that any analogy makes is that a particular set of features that 
were found to be in common between the source and target problems determines the 
same outcome for the two problems. Accordingly, the left-hand side of the arule gives 
the features that were judged by the metric to be shared by the two problems, and the 
right-hand side gives the operator-to-be-transferred. The arule will be used for judging 
whether the analogy is compelling (see Section 2. I .4). 
Example. Back to the insurance example, the RBR module has just proposed the ‘stu- 
dent’ rule as the provisional rule for Smith. The CBR module attempts to defeat this 
proposal by likening Smith to previous negative exemplars of the rule. As was shown 
above, Johnson is one such negative exemplar. The CBR module draws an analogy 
from Johnson to Smith, with respect to the inattentive operator, by applying the 
similarity metric. A similarity metric can, in general, be as simple or as complex as 
’ If there are multiple compelling analogies for different operators. this procedure will only find the first enc. 
The rationale is that multiple compelling analogies simply indicate multiple acceptable answers; the choice 
among them is immaterial. In practice, the issue of choosing among multiple compelling analogies was found 
to be unimportant; the current procedure already draws very few incorrect analogies (see Section 4.13). let 
alone incorrect analogies where an alternative compelling analogy would have been better. 
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desired, ranging from simply counting identical features, to doing a relevance-weighted 
feature comparison, to applying a full expert system for measuring similarity. For the 
insurance domain, a metric at the simple end of the spectrum was chosen: it counts the 
number of fields that match in the two client structures (and it ignores the operator-to- 
be-transferred). Text fields are considered to match if they are identical. Numeric fields 
match if the two numbers fall within the same interval of a predefined set of intervals. 
For the analogy from Johnson to Smith, the metric yields the arule: 
If address1 (c) = Sigma Chi House and address2( c) = Stanford, CA 
and sex(c) = M and age(c) < 30 and occupation(c) = student 
then inattentive. 
This arule expresses the features shared by Johnson and Smith according to the metric, 
The metric returns a similarity score of 5, which is the number of fields that match 
between Johnson and Smith (and hence also the number of conditions in the arule). 
2.1.4. Combination 
The combination module implements step (c) of RC-Hybrid: it decides which of 
the other modules to listen to, RBR or CBR. It does this by evaluating the analogies 
proposed by CBR. If it deems one of them to be compelling, then CBR wins; else 
RBR wins. Decisions of compellingness are based in part on the similarity score of 
the analogy. The similarity score is the degree to which the source and target problems 
match on relevant attributes, and thus the degree to which the problems are expected 
to have the same answer, according to the similarity metric. Because the metric is only 
a heuristic, however, the combination module does not rely on it exclusively; it also 
subjects the analogy to an empirical verification. This is a test of how well the arule- 
the generalization behind the analogy-works for other exemplars in the case library. 
The test returns two results: the arule’s accuracy, that is, the proportion of exemplars it 
got right; and the significance of the accuracy rating, which is 1 minus the probability 
of getting that high an accuracy merely by chance. The calculation of these results is 
explained in more detail below. 
Compellingness can now be expressed essentially as a conjunction of the two factors 
discussed above: the analogy must have a high similarity score, and it must perform 
well in the empirical verification. The conjunction enables more robust judgements of 
compellingness. An analogy between two apparently similar problems will be rejected 
if the similarity turns out not to be predictive for other examples; and an analogy that 
works by spurious coincidence on the available examples will be rejected if there is 
not also a plausible similarity between its source and target. The compellingness of an 
analogy A is defined more precisely as follows: 
Compelling-p(d) w 
similarity-score(d) > SSo 
and accuracy (A) >, A0 
and (significance(d) 2 SO or similarity-score(d) > SS,) 
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where SSo, SS,, Ao, and SO are thresholds for deciding when a value is high enough; they 
can be provided from the outside, or set by the threshold setting module (Section 2.2.3). 
This definition requires the analogy to be strong on all parameters-the score assigned by 
the similarity metric, and the accuracy and significance from the empirical verification. 
However, an escape clause-the disjunct involving SS+-provides a way of accepting 
analogies between overwhelmingly similar problems, even if there are not enough data 
for a significant accuracy reading. 
The calculation of the accuracy and significance of an analogy will now be explained 
in more detail. The first observation is that the arule may be viewed as a specialization- 
in particular, an exception class-of the provisional rule. It follows that the arule applies 
only to a subset of the exemplars (both negative and positive) of the provisional 
rule. It does not apply to the rest of the exemplars in the case library. When the 
arule does apply to an exemplar, it will suggest the application of the operator o 
on its right-hand side. This operator may or may not agree with the operator that is 
observed to have been applied to the exemplar. Several definitions can now be made. 
Let: 
0 
. 
. 
Th: 
m = number of exemplars that the arule applies to and that were observed to have 
had operator o applied, 
Iz = total number of exemplars that the arule applies to, 
M= number of exemplars of the provisional rule that were observed to have had 
operator n applied, 
N = total number of exemplars of the provisional rule. 
accuracy of the arule is then given by m/n. As mentioned above, the significance 
is one minus the probability, p, of getting that high an accuracy merely by chance. 
In calculating p, a slight correction is needed. The probability of getting m out of II 
exemplars right is influenced by the fact that the arule was constructed to be right for 
one of the exemplars-namely, the source case for the analogy. The calculation of p 
therefore pretends that this source case does not exist; it uses m’ = m - 1 and rz’ = n - 1 
in place of m and n. With this in mind, p can be calculated using Fisher’s exact test 
[ 13, p. 251: 
p = prob(getting at least m’/n’ by chance) 
(1) 
Unfortunately, Eq. (1) is computationally unpalatable for large values of N. An ap- 
proximation is therefore used. It assumes that N is large compared to rt’, which is 
reasonable for nontrivial-sized case libraries. Under this assumption, the probabilities 
can be calculated as if the exemplars are being drawn from an infinite population. Thus 
the probability of getting one exemplar right by chance is just equal to the proportion 
of “right” exemplars in the overall population-namely, r = M/N. The probability of 
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getting k exemplars right by chance will be #--each exemplar has the same probability, 
r, and the probabilities multiply. The revised derivation of p is then: 
p = prob(getting at least m//n’ by chance) 
= c prob(getting exactly k/n’ by chance) 
m’<k<n 
x c ($‘k( 1 - q-k. 
m’<k<n’ 
(2) 
Example. Consider again the analogy from Johnson to Smith. To decide whether this 
analogy is compelling, the combination module first runs an empirical verification. 
It tests the arule on the positive and negative exemplars of the provisional ‘student’ 
rule. It happens that the arule applies to four of these exemplars, Johnson and three 
others. Three of the four are listed as inattentive. Thus m = 3 and n = 4, giving 
an accuracy of 0.75. Turning to the ‘student’ rule as a whole, 4 out of 10 exemplars 
are listed as inattentive. So M = 4, N = 10, and I = 0.4. The significance of the 
accuracy rating then works out to be 0.648 by Eq. (2). 4 Also, as mentioned earlier, 
the similarity score of the analogy is 5. The thresholds in this domain were set to the 
values SSc = 4, SS+ = 6, Aa = 0.66, and SO = 0.50 (see Section 2.2.3). Thus the 
analogy is deemed compelling. The upshot is that Smith is determined to be inattentive, 
by analogy to a similar inattentive student from the same fraternity. Assuming that 
no compelling analogies are found in the balance of the problem solving, Smith will 
ultimately be assessed as medium risk, rather than low risk as the rules alone would 
have predicted. 
2.2. The support modules 
The knowledge structures required by the core method may not be readily available in 
all domains. The role of the support modules is to help construct these knowledge struc- 
tures. Each of the three support modules deals with a particular issue in the construction. 
The first, rational reconstruction, deals with the issue that while a set of problem/answer 
pairs may be available for the domain, the path by which each answer was derived may 
not be-but these paths are needed by the core method as part of the case library. 
Rational reconstruction uses the weak theory to infer the path of operators leading from 
each problem to its answer. 
The second support module, theory extension, deals with the issue that the weak theory 
may have gaps that prevent the abovementioned reconstructions from going through. 
When such a gap is exposed, theory extension proposes plausible new operators or rules 
to add to the weak theory to bridge the gap. 
The third support module, threshold setting, deals with the issue that there may 
not be predefined values to use for the four thresholds in the definition of analogical 
4 For comparison, Fisher’s exact test in Eq. ( 1) would have given 0.667; the discrepancy is noticeable 
because N is so small in this toy example. 
compellingness. Threshold setting chooses values via a learning procedure that generates 
training examples for itself from the case library. 
The support modules effectively reduce the knowledge requirements of the architecture 
to three: a weak theory, a set of problem/answer pairs, and a similarity metric. Rational 
reconstruction and theory extension have hooks to incorporate supplemental domain 
knowledge if desired. as discussed below. The following sections briefly describe the 
three support modules. A more complete description can be found in Golding [ 141. 
2.2. I. Rutiorlal reconstructiot~ 
Examples of problems and their answers are available in many domains-spellings and 
their phonetic transcriptions in pronunciation, patients and their diagnoses in medicine, 
theorems and their proofs in mathematics, etc. What tends to be not so widely available 
is the chain of reasoning by which each answer was derived-experts have trouble 
articulating how they pronounced a name, or arrived at a particular diagnosis, or came 
up with a proof. Unfortunately, without this information, an answer is of rather limited 
use; it can only be applied IO new problems in toto. Any system that wants to transfer 
just part of the answer to a new problem needs some way of breaking down the answer 
into individual steps. The rational reconstruction module (RR) provides a way of doing 
this. Given a problem and an answer-and using a weak theory of the domain-RR 
infers an operator sequence that leads from the problem to the answer. 
Rational reconstruction can be viewed as a problem of search for an operator sequence. 
The operators in the sequence arc drawn from a weak theory of the domain. The sequence 
must satisfy two constraints. First, it must account for the given problem and answer: 
Validity: The operator sequence, when applied to the problem, must produce the 
answer. 
It may happen that no operator sequence satisfies the validity constraint; this signals 
that the weak theory is missin g one or more operators. In this case, RR calls theory 
extension to fill the gap. The opposite problem is when there are multiple valid operator 
sequences. Here, RR invokes the rules of the weak theory as a bias: it prefers the 
operator sequence that is closest to what the rules would have predicted. The idea is 
that even though the rules are not perfect, they are good enough to steer RR toward 
plausible derivations. This is expressed in a second constraint: 
Minimality The operator sequence must deviate minimally from the sequence pre- 
dicted by the rules of the weak theory. 
This brings up a second opportunity for patching the weak theory: if RR cannot find 
a valid operator sequence with zero deviation, this means that the rules do not predict 
a valid operator sequence for the problem at issue. In such cases, RR may call theory 
extension to alter the rules such that they do predict a valid operator sequence. This 
option is rarely invoked, however; the primary approach of the architecture is not to fix 
imperfect rules, but to supplement them with CBR. 
The two constraints above lead to two strategies for RR: the validity-first strategy, 
which generates valid operator sequences and selects the one with minimal deviation; and 
the minimality-first strategy. which generates operator sequences in order of increasing 
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deviation, and selects the first valid one. The deviation of an operator sequence is the sum 
of the deviations of each of its operators, where a deviation metric measures the deviation 
of an operator. The default metric scores 0 if the operator agrees with the one predicted 
by the rules, and 1 otherwise. The scoring can be made more sophisticated by including 
domain-specific knowledge that penalizes deviations according to their severity. The 
validity-first and minimality-first strategies, and combinations thereof, define a space of 
possible strategies for doing RR. The particular strategy that is best for a given domain 
depends on a number of factors, including the accuracy of the rules in the domain. 
Pruning and ordering heuristics may be used in conjunction with either strategy to speed 
it up. 
A couple of observations about RR can be made at this point. The first is that RR can 
be regarded as doing a form of credit assignment. In particular, suppose that RR is given 
a problem/answer pair that has several valid reconstructions, each of which violates a 
different rule. Then RR, in choosing among these reconstructions, is implicitly doing 
credit assignment, as it is deciding which rule violations hold. Moreover, it is doing 
the credit assignment by invoking a minimality bias-it selects the reconstruction with 
the smallest total deviation from the rules. Put another way, it assigns credit so as to 
minimize the total amount of blame. 
The second observation concerns RR’s effectiveness as a function of the directness 
of the operators in the weak theory. A direct operator affects the final answer of a 
problem by directly altering some part of it. An indirect operator does not manipulate 
the answer itself, but rather affects the choice of other operators. Indirect operators tend 
to be harder to reconstruct, because they are relatively unconstrained by the answer. 
RR must therefore rely more on its minimality bias in reconstructing them. This can be 
dangerous, as the minimality bias is only as accurate as the rules of the weak theory. 
By and large, therefore, the more direct the operators in the weak theory are, the more 
effective RR will be. 
There is a variety of work related to RR, including learning apprentices, plan recog- 
nizers, student-modelling systems, and story-understanding systems. These systems all 
infer some kind of trace of the reasoning behind an agent’s observed behavior. Such 
systems typically enforce the validity constraint; that is, they produce traces that are 
consistent with the observed behavior. The differences among systems lie in the bias 
they use for choosing among the valid traces. One simple bias is to return the first valid 
trace found; this is the approach taken in PAM [40], a story-understanding system. 
A widely used bias is to prefer the simplest valid trace-i.e., the one that makes the 
fewest assumptions-as in, for example, the plan-recognition work of Kautz and Allen 
[ 181. The ACCEL system [26], which has also been used for plan recognition, instead 
prefers the most coherent trace. CELIA [29], a learning apprentice in the domain of 
automotive repair, prefers the valid trace that is thought to best capture the hierarchi- 
cal goal structure underlying the linear sequence of the expert’s actions. Other systems 
adopt the same bias as RR: they prefer the valid trace that is closest to what a the- 
ory would have predicted. Such systems can be classified according to where they fall 
in the space of strategies described above for RR. For instance, the BUGGY student- 
modelling system [5] uses a minimality-first strategy to infer a model of how a student 
does arithmetic. 
Example. The toy insurance domain, as usual, will furnish an illustration of RR. A pure 
validity-first strategy will be used, with no pruning or ordering heuristics. Consider the 
reconstruction of the operator sequence for client Johnson (see Fig. 4). The validity- 
first strategy first generates all valid operator sequences that account for the answer of 
medium risk: 
( I ) attentive, *endangered, medium-risk, 
(2) attentive,neutral, *medium-risk. 
(1) *inattentive, *endangered, *medium-risk, 
(4) *inattentive, neutral, medium-risk. 
The deviation of each sequence is then measured. Operators that are found to disagree 
with the ones predicted by the rules have been marked above with an asterisk (*). If 
the default deviation metric is used, then sequences ( I ), (Z), and (4) tie for first place 
with a score of 1.0; the choice among them can only be made arbitrarily. However, 
the deviation metric that was actually used for this toy domain treats violations of the 
‘student’ rule as less serious than other violations. Thus operator sequence (4) wins, as 
reflected in the reconstruction information shown in Fig. 4. 
In the process of reconstructing how an observed answer was derived, RR is bound 
to turn up inadequacies of the weak theory. In such cases, the theory extension module 
(TE) is invoked to patch the weak theory appropriately. The general problem of theory 
repair is quite difficult. Wilkins 141. Chapter 41 gives a good overview of various 
techniques that have been tried; there has been subsequent work under the rubric of 
abduction [25] for example. Because the general problem is so hard, TE takes a 
restricted approach to theory repair. It is geared to the two particular situations in which 
TE is invoked by RR. 
The lirst situation is when RR cannot tind a valid operator sequence for a given 
problem/answer pair. Viewing reconstruction as a search task, this means there was no 
complete path from the start state (containing the problem) to the goal state (containing 
the answer). TE tries to complete the path by proposing new operators to bridge gaps 
between previously unconnected states. In general, there will be multiple sets of operators 
that will do this. TE selects the minimal set, where minimality is defined by a cost 
metric. The cost metric typically uses domain-specific knowledge to evaluate the cost of 
inventing a new operator between a given pair of states. 
The second situation in which TE may be invoked is when RR cannot find a valid 
operator sequence that has zero deviation from the rules. This presents an opportunity 
to alter the rules to bring their prediction into agreement with one of the valid operator 
sequences. However, TE will only attempt this under very constrained circumstances. 
In particular, if it is known that a certain class of rules in the domain fits a particular 
template, then TE can try proposing a new rule by instantiating the template for the 
current problem. If this improves the deviation score of the best valid operator sequence, 
then the new rule may be worth adding to the theory. 
In the existing implementation, TE requests user approval before actually making any 
of its proposed changes. This provides a sanity check on whether the extensions appear 
to be reasonable. 
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attentive 
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or inattentive or neutral or low-risk 
Fig. 7. RR’s search space for client Davis, whose answer has been modified to be negligible(Davis). Black 
arcs indicate applications of existing operators. Gray arcs are for new operators being considered by TE. 
Example. RR was able to reconstruct the 30 cases in the case library for the toy insur- 
ance domain without recourse to TE. For illustrative purposes, however, RR was run on 
a couple of additional examples and forced to call TE. In the first of these examples, 
client Davis (see Fig. 4) was modified to have an answer of negligible(Davis). RR 
could not find any operator sequence to explain this answer, and so it called TE. RR’s 
search space is shown in Fig. 7. State SO is the start state, containing the information ini- 
tially known about the case: name( Davis) = Davis, address1 (Davis) = Toyon Hall, and 
so on. State sr is the final state, containing the answer negligible(Davis). Arcs represent 
operator applications; for instance, an arc leaving state so applies the attentive oper- 
ator, resulting in a state st containing the new assertion attentive(Davis). In the figure, 
the attentive arc and resulting state st have been collapsed with the arc and resulting 
state for its sibling operator, inattentive. This collapsing was done throughout the 
diagram to hide distinctions irrelevant to theory extension. 
RR’s inability to reconstruct Davis can be seen from the unreachability of the final 
state sr from the initial state so. TR’s job is to fix this by adding one or more new 
operators. Four operators are considered, GO001 through G0004, shown by the gray 
arcs in the figure. To choose among these, TE applies a cost metric for the insur- 
ance domain. The metric is based on the number of inferences in a state, where an 
inference is an assertion added by an operator. The initial state has zero inferences. 
State s2 has two inferences, because two assertions are needed to reach it; e.g., at- 
tentive(Davis) and neutral(Davis). State sr has three inferences, because other final 
states in this domain have three inferences, and the number of inferences is taken 
to be a constant across final states. The metric then defines the cost of an opera- 
tor to be the number of inferences it is implicitly making by going from one state 
to another. For instance, the cost of GO002 is 2, because it goes from a state with 
one inference to a state with three inferences. If an operator implicitly makes zero 
or a negative number of inferences, it is considered nonsensical, and is assigned an 
infinite cost. The effect of this metric is to connect the initial and final states us- 
ing existing operators to account for as many inferences as possible, and new op- 
erators for as few as possible. This is a rudimentary example of how a cost met- 
ric can guide TE toward minimal extensions of the theory. By the metric, operators 
GO001 through GO004 have costs 3, 2, 1, and infinity, respectively; hence TE prefers 
G0003. This enables RR to infer the operator sequence attentive, neutral, GO003 
for Davis. 
As an example of TE for rules, consider the rational reconstruction of client Johnson. 
As mentioned above, Johnson has four valid operator sequences: 
(I) attentive, *endangered,medium-risk, 
(2) attentive, neutral, *medium-risk, 
(3) *inattentive, *endangered, *medium-risk, 
(4) *inattentive, neutral, medium-risk. 
Asterisks (*) in the list mark rule violations. The sequence with the smallest deviation 
from the rules was sequence (4 1 (as shown in Section 2.2.1), but it still has a positive 
deviation. This signals an opportunity for extending the rules. Now suppose that the 
following rule template is known: 
If address2 (c ) = __ then endangered. 
TE may then instantiate the template for Johnson, yielding: 
If address2(c) = Stanford, CA then endangered. 
When this rule is inserted into the weak theory, it brings sequence ( I) above into 
complete agreement with the rules-i.e., it gives it a deviation of zero. This is an 
improvement from the previous best deviation, which was for sequence (4), and was 
nonzero. TE therefore proposes this new rule as a possible extension to the theory.’ 
2.2.3. Threshold settirrg 
The threshold setting module (Tset) provides a principled way of choosing values 
for the thresholds of the core method. The thresholds are used in determining when an 
analogy is compelling. The definition of compellingness is repeated here for convenience: 
Compelling-p(d) G.=G? 
similarity-score(d) > SSO 
and accuracy ( A) 3 AO 
and (significance(d) 3 $1 or similarity-score(d) 3 SS,). 
The point of compellingness is to enable the architecture to decide when it should listen 
to an analogy-i.e., when the analogy is right and the rules are wrong. The goal of 
Tset, consequently, is to pick values for the thresholds that will result in analogies being 
classified as compelling whenever they would correct wrong answers of the rules. Tset 
takes a machine-learning approach: it generates training analogies, and tries to pick 
the thresholds so as to do the right thing for these training analogies-that is, it should 
accept analogies that correct wron g answers of the rules, and, conversely, it should reject 
analogies that spoil right answers of the rules. The approach is semi-automatic in that 
the user has the final say of what values to pick, based on Tset’s recommendations. 
Tset generates its training analogies from the case library. It pretends that each 
exemplar in the case library in turn is a target problem, and it finds all analogies 
s Although the new rule improves the system’s account of ihis particular client, it may worsen its account of 
other clients. The system depends on the user to verify that the rules proposed by TE are in fact reasonable 
additions to the theory. 
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Fig. 8. Distributions of helpful, harmful, and misclassified analogies, as a function of similarity score, &To 
and SS+ mark the theoretically optimal settings for the similarity thresholds. 
to it from other exemplars. A training analogy is classified as helpful if it suggests the 
right operator for a target problem where the rules would have suggested the wrong 
operator. An analogy is harmful if it suggests the wrong operator for a problem where 
the rules would have suggested the right operator. Tset’s task may now be framed as 
one of selecting threshold values that minimize the number of misclassified analogies, 
where misclassified analogies are the helpful ones that are judged uncompelling plus the 
harmful ones that are judged compelling. 
While Tset could, in principle, search the 4-dimensional space of threshold settings 
for the one that minimizes the number of misclassified analogies, this turns out to be 
quite costly in practice. Instead of trying to set all 4 thresholds simultaneously, therefore, 
Tset sets them one at a time. This gives up the guarantee of finding the global minimum 
in exchange for tractable run time. The threshold-setting procedure has three steps. On 
the first step, Tset temporarily adopts a simplified definition of compellingness: 
Compelling-p’ ( d) e+ 
similarity-score(d) > SO. 
This definition requires setting only one threshold, SSa, to minimize the number of 
misclassified analogies. Fig. 8 shows what prototypical distributions of helpful, harmful, 
and misclassified analogies would look like at this stage of the processing. The value 
of SO that minimizes the number of misclassified analogies is also shown. Tset does 
not choose this value automatically, however, but rather displays the distributions to the 
user and lets him make the final decision. The SS+ threshold is also set at this point, 
the natural choice being a value just high enough to exclude all harmful analogies. 
Once a value of S.90 is selected, all training analogies whose similarity scores fall 
below this value can be discarded; they have already been classified as uncompelling, and 
so offer no information about how to set the rest of the thresholds. Each subsequent step 
of the threshold-setting procedure therefore has fewer training analogies to process- 
only the ones that are left unclassified by the previous steps. This makes the subsequent 
steps faster to run, although it also makes their conclusions less reliable due to the 
smaller number of examples on which they are based. 
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Fig. 9. Results of applying the threshold-setting procedure to the toy insurance problem. For each of the three 
steps of the procedure, the distributions of helpful, harmful. and misclassified training analogies are shown. 
The misclassified analogies are the helpful ones below a threshold value and the harmful ones at or above the 
value. Dashed lines indicate the values chosen for the thresholds. 
The second and third steps of the threshold-setting procedure set the A0 and SO 
thresholds, respectively. These steps are similar to the first (except that there is no 
analog to SS,). Each step adopts a temporary definition of compellingness, adding one 
more conjunct of the true definition. At the end of the third step, all four thresholds--S&, 
SS,, ACJ, and So-will have been set. 
Example. Tset was used to set the thresholds for the insurance problem. The results 
appear in Fig. 9. The distributions of analogies are shown for each of the three steps 
of the procedure. These curves do not quite have the ideal shape depicted in Fig. 8, 
A.R. Gelding, P.S. Rosenbloom/Artifcial Intelligence 87 (1996) 215-254 233 
being based on only 30 cases, the number available for the insurance problem. The 
threshold values that were selected for this task were SSn = 4.0, SS+ = 6.0, A0 = 
0.66, and So = 0.50. The values for SSe, SS+, and A0 were selected at or near the 
optimum values. The choice of So was less clear-cut, as the error curve was largely flat 
between 0.0 and 0.65 (this was because it was based on a lopsided 34 helpful analogies 
and 1 harmful analogy). Its value of 0.50 was chosen somewhat arbitrarily within this 
range. 
2.3. Discussion 
A number of “frequently asked questions” about the design of the architecture are 
discussed below. They are grouped by whether they concern the combination of RBR 
and CBR, just RBR, or just CBR. 
2.3. I. Combination issues 
Why is RBR applied before CBR? Rule-based and case-based reasoning can be com- 
bined in three main orders: RBR first, CBR first, or some interleaving of the two. The 
architecture presented here adopts the RBR-first strategy, using CBR merely to patch 
errors left by RBR. This strategy is appropriate when the rules are reasonably efficient 
and accurate to begin with. If the rules are deficient in some way, the CBR-first strategy 
may make more sense. If the rules and cases offer more balanced contributions to the 
problem solving, then an interleaving strategy may be best. 
Can analogies be drawn from positive exemplars? While the architecture currently 
draws all of its analogies from negative xemplars, analogies from positive exemplars 
could also be useful in certain situations. One way to use them would be to decide 
between RBR and CBR by weighing the evidence from positive analogies against hat 
from negative analogies. The drawback of this approach, however, is that it relies on 
the case library to illustrate not only the places where the rules are wrong, but also 
all situations where they apply correctly. Given that the rules are assumed to be fairly 
accurate to begin with, this could require a huge number of positive exemplars. 
An alternative that relies less on having total analogical coverage of the domain is to 
use positive analogies to resolve nondeterminism in the rules-places where the rules 
suggest multiple operators. The operator with the greatest support from positive analogies 
is then selected. This approach is less sensitive to gaps in positive coverage because it 
compares positive analogies to other positive analogies, not to negative analogies. Gaps 
in positive coverage therefore tend to affect all operators in the comparison equally 
(especially if the evidence for each operator is averaged over a set of positive analogies). 
Such a scheme was implemented in Anapron, and is described below (see Section 3.3). 
This use of positive analogies may be regarded as a method for combining rules and 
cases to make nondeterministic answers unique. By contrast, the architecture presented 
here is a method for combining rules and cases to make deterministic answers more 
accurate. The two methods provide orthogonal functionality, and may be used separately 
or in combination. Anapron is an example of using them in combination. 
Could rules and cases be converted into a uniform representation? An alternative 
to a truly hybrid system-one that works from multiple representations-is to convert 
all knowledge sources into a uniform representation, and work from that. Converting 
between rules and cases tends to be hazardous, however; the conversion tends to yield 
inefficient or unreliable representations. See also Golding and Rosenbloom [ I5 1. 
2.3.2. RBR issues 
What if the rules are not of an i&then-else form ? The architecture assumes that 
exactly one rule will lire in any state to recommend the next operator to apply. This 
affords an easy way of assignin g credit to the rules: a rule is held responsible for the 
operators it recommends. This credit assignment enables the architecture to improve the 
performance of the rules-it lets it associate past mistakes (negative exemplars) with 
particular rules, and later override similar incorrect behaviors by analogy to the past 
mistakes. In a more distributed, evidence-gathering model of problem solving, such as 
that of MYCIN 171, multiple rules can fire. and all contribute to each decision that 
is made. To accommodate such a rule formalism into the architecture, an analogous 
credit-assignment procedure would be needed-one that would ascribe some proportion 
of the credit for each decision to each of the rules that contributed to it. 
2.3.3. CBR issues 
What is the appropriate level of generality for arules? Each time the architecture 
draws an analogy, it extracts the generalization behind the analogy, and represents it 
as an explicit rule, the arule. It then uses the arule to do an empirical verification of 
the analogy. This involves trying out the arule on other cases in the case library. The 
purpose is to see how well the generalization holds up for other examples. 
An arule is not uniquely determined; the only constraint is that it must be a gener- 
alization of the source and target problems. Currently, the architecture makes the arule 
maximally specific-it includes in the arule all conditions shared by the source and tar- 
get (according to the similarity metric). The idea is to minimize the inductive leap; this 
reduces the risk of overgeneralization. However, there is an argument for generalizing 
more liberally: the more general the arule is. the easier it will be to find cases in the 
case library to which the arule applies, and thus the more informed the empirical veri- 
fication will be. Striking an appropriate balance between this greater ease of empirical 
verification and the risk of overgeneralization is an area for future work. 
Could the architecture save its arules? Given that the architecture already goes to 
the trouble of extracting the generalizations behind its analogies (as arules), it certainly 
could store them. Incorporating the arule into the existing rule set is straightforward: 
the arule represents an exception class of the rule from which it originated. Thus the 
arule would be stored so as to always override the original rule. If the rules are of an 
if-r/zen-else form, this means ordering the arule just ahead of the original rule. 
Saving arules in this way would gradually “compile” the cases into rules, thereby 
shifting the burden of problem solving from CBR to RBR. Whether this should be done 
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is basically a store-versus-compute tradeoff. The architecture can store its arules, in 
which case it saves the time of rederiving the analogies; or it can compute the arules, 
in which case it saves the storage cost of keeping around all past arules. One could 
imagine resolving this tradeoff in either direction. The decision in the architecture to 
(re-)compute, rather than store, was based on the reasoning that, because the arules are 
constructed to be maximally specific (as discussed above), a policy of storing would 
end up keeping a large number of rules that hardly ever fired; moreover, these rules 
could easily be rederived if needed. 
How does the architecture do case adaptation? Case adaptation is the process of 
transforming a source case to make it applicable to a (disparate) target case. Traditional 
techniques for case adaptation involve retrieving the entire source solution, and doing 
localized problem solving to patch the parts that are incompatible with the target case. 
The architecture presented here takes a different tack: using RR, it factors the source 
case into individual operator applications. It then draws analogies from these individual 
operator applications to the target problem. The individual operator applications are 
sufficiently fine grained that they can generally be transferred to the target problem 
verbatim. Thus the architecture employs a strategy of “case adaptation by factoring”. 
This strategy is related to the idea of decomposing a source case into smaller parts, or 
snippets, each of which addresses one subgoal of the case [ 211. 
Can the architecture learn new cases? Classical CBR [ 301 involves a learning step: 
after a target case is solved, it is stored back into the case library to enrich the system’s 
bank of experience. Such a learning step could be incorporated into the architecture 
presented here by having the architecture ask, after each problem it solves, whether its 
solution is correct. If the answer is affirmative, the case may be added to the case library 
directly. If not, further dialogue would be needed to debug the answer before it is stored 
away. This procedure is not currently implemented because it would create a need for 
run-time feedback from the user. However, additional cases can always be added to the 
case library off-line if desired. 
How is noise in the case library handled? The architecture protects itself against 
inaccurate cases through empirical verification. A bad case may lead to a bad analogy 
being proposed; but the analogy will be rejected unless there is a significant number of 
supporting cases. The one exception is if the bad analogy has a high enough similarity 
score to exceed the SS+ threshold; in that event, it will be accepted even without other 
supporting cases. This is highly unlikely, however, as the SS+ threshold should have 
been set high enough to avoid such spurious analogies. 
3. Anapron 
The architecture presented here was applied to name pronunciation, resulting in the 
Anapron system. Names, because of their varied etymology, are a notorious stumbling 
block for pronunciation systems; this has made name pronunciation an important problem 
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in text-to-speech synthesis. The domain is well suited to application of the architecture, 
as reasonably accurate and efficient rules of pronunciation are known, yet the domain is 
sufficiently complex that perfect rules have never been devised-rules inevitably have 
exceptions. This suggests application of the architecture presented here. The architecture 
can take advantage of the existing rules, imperfect though they may be, while also 
tapping into an alternative knowledge source, namely examples of names and their 
pronunciations. By assimilating knowledge from both sources, the architecture has the 
potential to outperform existing systems, which are either rule-based or case-based, but 
not true hybrids. 
The sections below start by introducing the domain of name pronunciation. The appli- 
cation of the architecture to this domain is then described; and an additional analogical 
mechanism is presented that was incorporated to deal with nondeterminism in the rules. 
The descriptions are at a high level, to give the basic idea of Anapron’s operation and a 
sense of the task of name pronunciation, without getting deep into the intricacies of the 
domain. For full details, see Golding [ 141. 
3. I. Name pronunciation 
Name pronunciation is a problem of practical interest. It comes up in almost any 
text-to-speech application, but especially name-intensive applications, such as telephone- 
based credit validation, voice mail, and generic reverse directory assistance (i.e., number 
to name) [ 381. The most important property that makes names unique, as compared to 
regular words, is their varied etymology. Not only must a pronunciation system infer 
the language of origin of a name, it must then decide how to treat foreign names. 
Strict adherence to the native pronunciations can come out sounding stilted at best, 
and unintelligible at worst. What is needed, assuming an American user population, is 
some appropriately anglicized interpretation of the foreign languages. These etymology- 
related difficulties make names problematic for pronunciation systems. The brute-force 
solution would be to construct a giant pronouncing dictionary of all names the system 
is apt to encounter. The problem is that the set of names is in general open-ended. 
A system reading stories off the AP newswire, for instance, has to contend with a 
constantly changing set of newsworthy individuals, In the end, one can only expend 
a finite amount of resources building a name dictionary; pronunciation systems will 
always have to deal with the problem of unfamiliar names. 
Until fairly recently, the solution was simply to pronounce names badly; pronunciation 
of proper names was acknowledged to be an open problem [ 191. In recent years, 
however, a substantial effort has been devoted to the problem, resulting in several 
high-quality commercial systems. The predominant approach has been to develop rules 
tailored specifically to names, as in, for example, the OratorTM 6 system (341 and 
DECvoice [ 371. While these systems have achieved among the best performance yet 
demonstrated, they have also shown the extreme difficulty of writing rules to cover 
every contingency. No matter how many rules are written, there always seem to be 
exceptions. This observation is the basis for an alternative approach to the problem, 
h Orator is a trademark of Bellcore. 
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Table 1 
Illustration of Anapron’s pronunciation modules for &IDEL; the output of the modules has been abridged for 
clarity 
Module 
Language 
Morphology 
Transcription 
Syllable structure 
Stress assignment 
Selection 
Function 
Determine language 
Identify prefix, root, and suffix morphemes 
Map letters to phones 
Break into syllables 
Assign level of stress to each syllable 
Pick best language/morphology analysis 
Application to KEIDEL 
Generic or German 
KEIDEL = a single root morpheme 
kiydehl if Generic; 
kaydehl if German 
kiy-dehl if Generic; 
kay-dehl if German 
k-iydehl if Generic; 
k‘ayd-ehl if German 
k‘ayd*ehl (German) 
which views name pronunciation more as a huge bag of idiosyncratic behaviors than as 
a rule-governed process. The approach, embodied in the TTS system [ 91, is essentially 
case based, starting from a large dictionary of names and their pronunciations, and 
pronouncing a new name by retrieving a relevant source name from the dictionary, and 
performing one of a number of prespecified transformations, such as suffix exchange 
(e.g., AGNANO = AGNELLI - ELLI + ANO). ‘ITS performs well-comparably to the 
rule-based systems mentioned above-but like those other systems, still leaves room 
for improvement. The good, but imperfect performance of both the rule-based and 
case-based approaches to name pronunciation suggests combining the two; however, no 
previous, practical system has taken a true hybrid approach. Sullivan and Damper [35] 
have combined rules and cases in a model of human pronunciation, but their model 
generates either a pure rule-based or a pure case-based solution-it does not intermix 
RBR and CBR within a solution as Anapron does. 
Name pronunciation is defined here as the task of converting an input spelling, e.g., 
KEIDEL, into an output pronunciation, e.g., k‘ ayd’ehl (rhymes with MY BELL). 7 The 
pronunciation is a written specification of how to pronounce the name; it could be fed 
through a speech synthesizer to produce an actual spoken rendition. A pronunciation 
includes the sequence of phones or sounds in the name, as well as the level of stress 
to place on each syllable. Here, the phones are kaydehl, while . and * are stress 
marks. The * says to put secondary stress on kay. The * means primary stress on 
dehl. The notation is taken from DECtalk TM ’ but is unimportant for purposes of this , 
paper. 
In Anapron, the task of name pronunciation is divided among six principle modules. 
Table 1 gives a brief account of what each module does, by way of illustration for 
KEIDEL. Transcription and stress assignment are the top-level modules: they contribute 
to the output pronunciation directly. The other modules are in service of transcription 
and stress. The language and morphology modules produce nondeterministic answers. 
Here, the language module generates two possible language classifications of the name- 
7 This is an example of an appropriately anglicized pronunciation. The native German pronunciation more 
nearly rhymes with IDLE [ Stefanie Brtininghaus, personal communication, 19951. 
8 DECtalk is a trademark of Digital Equipment Corporation. 
“Generic” or German. This nondeterminism 1s carried through the other modules until 
the selection module resolves it by choosing the German analysis. The way the selection 
module makes its choice is discussed below (see Section 3.3). 
3.2. Applicutim of the architec~trrrr~ 
The architecture was applied not to the task of name pronunciation as a whole, but 
to its two top-level subtasks: transcription and stress assignment. This section sketches 
the application of the architecture to each of these subtasks. The knowledge sources are 
briefy described, followed by an illustration of the architecture’s operation using them. 
The architecture works from three knowlcdgc sources for each task: a weak theory, :I 
set of problem/answer pairs, and a similarity metric. The weak theory for transcription 
was based on the rules of the MITalk text-to-speech system [ I], as well as introductory 
grammar texts for French, German, Italian, and Spanish. Each operator in the weak 
theory says how to map a letter or letter cluster into a string of phones. For instance, 
the operator C:S says to map the letter c to the sound s, i.e., a soft C. as in CENT. The 
basic operation of the theory is then to work through the name, applying operators to 
transcribe each letter or letter cluster. The rules for choosing which operator to apply can 
test the letters on either side of the cluster being transcribed, the language of the name, 
and its morphological structure. For example. one rule recommends the C:s operator if 
the following letter is I, E, or Y, and the name is of Latinate origin--this is the familiar 
“C softening” rule. A rule can also test how surrounding letters were trmscriDe& this 
imposes the constraint that the surrounding letters be transcribed before the rule at 
issue is matched. Such constraints restrict the possible orders in which the letters of a 
name may be processed. Occasionally a circular dependency may arise, in which case a 
deadlock-resolution strategy is invoked. The weak theory for transcription has a total ot 
295 operators and 619 rules. 
The weak theory for stress assignment is based on MITalk, the grammar texts men- 
tioned above, and the stress theory of Liberman and Prince (241. The goal of stress 
assignment is to assign a level of stress-primary, secondary, or zero (i.e., no stress) -to 
each syllable in the name. The weak theory starts by assigning stress to each morpheme 
in the name individually. This is done in two backward passes of the morpheme: the first 
pass makes a binary decision as to whether each syllable has zero or nonzero stress; the 
second pass refines these binary stress levels into a proper three-valued stress pattern. 
The stress patterns for the individual morphemes are then combined into a stress pattern 
for the whole name, based on imposing a hierarchical structure on the morphemes. The 
operators of the weak theory provide primitives for implementing the above procedure. 
For instance. two operators implement the first backward pass of assigning Lero or 
nonzcro stress to each syllable of a morpheme: MSR, which identifies the last syllable 
with nonzero stress; and propagate, which repeatedly jumps backward to the next 
syllable with nonzero stress. The rules of the weak theory control which operator is 
applied and how it is instantiated-e.g.. how many syllables the propagate operator 
should jump back each time. The rules can test the spelling of the name, its language, 
morphological structure, transcription, and syllable structure. The weak theory for stress 
has 7 operators (not including instantiations thereof) and 29 rules. 
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The second knowledge source of the architecture, the set of problem/answer pairs, 
was derived, in the case of both transcription and stress assignment, from a pronouncing 
dictionary of 5000 surnames. 9 The dictionary includes the 2500 most frequent names 
in the US, 1250 sampled randomly from ranks 2500 through 10,000, and 1250 from 
ranks 10,000 to 60,000. The utility of these last two groups is to illustrate patterns that 
are important but that may not appear in the very common names. 
The similarity metrics used in Anapron are based on broad, approximate knowledge 
about which factors determine a given aspect of a name’s pronunciation. For transcrip- 
tion, there are two factors. First, the letters in the immediate vicinity of the cluster- 
to-be-transcribed affect the cluster’s pronunciation. This is due to assimilation effects: 
while the mouth is pronouncing the cluster, it is anticipating the next sounds, as well as 
retaining aspects of the previous ones. The second factor affecting the transcription of 
the cluster is the overall “shape” of the name-essentially, its pattern of (orthographic) 
consonants and vowels. The shape affects the pronunciation in that it reflects global 
influences such as language and morphology. The transcription metric takes the two 
preceding factors into account by combining a detailed comparison of the two names 
immediately around the letter cluster being transcribed with a rough global comparison 
of the names. 
The stress metric is analogous to the transcription metric: it does a careful comparison 
of the two names in the region that is most critical for the particular stress operator 
at issue, as well as a rough global comparison, to pick up on effects of language and 
morphology. More detailed specifications of the metrics can be found in Golding [ 141. 
The remainder of this section illustrates how Anapron, given the abovementioned 
knowledge sources, pronounces names. The illustration will be for the transcription of 
the KEIDEL example of Table 1. Transcription of KEIDEL is actually performed twice, 
once assuming the name is Generic, and once assuming it is German. This example is 
for the German case. As mentioned above, transcription involves applying operators to 
the name, in some order, to map letter clusters to strings of phones. Anapron selects the 
operators via the RC-Hybrid procedure. Table 9 summarizes the results, disregarding the 
order in which the letters are actually processed. For the first letter of the name, K, RBR 
is invoked first, and suggests the K:k operator, which maps the letter K to the phone 
k (as in KITE). CBR is then invoked to propose analogies contradicting this choice of 
operator, but no such analogy is found. The combination module therefore applies the 
operator suggested by the rules, K:k. Application of the next two operators in the table, 
EI:ay and D:d, is similarly uneventful. 
For the E, things get more interesting. The rules suggest E:ey, the default pronunci- 
ation of E in German (as in F--GE). However, CBR finds an analogy from VOGEL 
which suggests the E:eh operator instead. This analogy has a similarity score of 0.73. 
Empirical verification reveals that the generalization behind the analogy-which says 
to apply E:eh in German names in a particular context-applies to 7 cases in the case 
library: EDELBROCK, FOGEL, GEIBEL, LOGEL, SCHNABEL, SPEIDE_, and of course 
VOGEL. All 7 have E:eh applied. Thus the accuracy of the analogy is 7/7 = 1.00. 
The significance works out to be 0.71. The way the thresholds were set, the analogy is 
‘) This dictionary was kindly provided by Bellcore for purposes of this research. 
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Table 2 
Transcription of t&IDEI. under the German analysis; the table shows the 
transcription operators recommended for each letter of the name by RBR. 
CBR, and combination 
RBR CBR Combination 
K K:k K:k 
I 
1 
may m:ay 
I) t,.d rxd 
Ii r::ey i::eh E:eh 
I. 1.:1 LA 
_ _____ 
deemed compelling. Thus the combination module selects E:eh, overriding the rules by 
the analogy with VOGEL. 
For the final L of the name, the rules suggest ~:l, which again goes unchallenged. 
Thus the output of the transcription module for the German analysis of KEIDEL is 
kaydehl-as opposed to kaydeyl. which is what the rules alone would have said. 
3.3. Positive analogies 
As mentioned above, the language and morphology rules in Anapron return multiple 
answers, due to the difficulty of uniquely analyzing these aspects of a name. This rule 
nondeterminism is resolved by the selection module, through the method of positive 
analogies. The idea of the method is to use the positive exemplars in the case base 
to reinforce correct rule applications, just as negative exemplars were used to detect 
incorrect rule applications. The method starts with multiple candidate pronunciations of 
a name, corresponding to the different ways of applying the language and morphology 
rules. It evaluates each candidate pronunciation by seeing if the operators that were 
applied in deriving that pronunciation seem to have been applied correctly. It does this 
by drawing analogies between each operator application in the pronunciation and the 
positive exemplars of the rule that recommended that operator. The closer the operator 
application is to a previously seen, correct application, the more favorable the system’s 
evaluation of that operator will be. Specifically, the score for an operator is the similarity 
score of the best analogy found. The overall score for a pronunciation is the average of 
the scores of its transcription and stress operators. lo 
Table 3 shows how positive analogies were used in the KEIDEL example. Only the 
analogies for transcription operators are shown. On these, the German analysis outscored 
the Generic analysis; the same turns out to be true of the overall scores, which is why 
the German analysis was ultimately selected. The main reason the German analysis did 
“’ In addition, a pronunciation may receive bonuses or penalties assigned by the rules. The most common type 
of bonus is when a name contains a prefix or suffix characteristic of a particular language. For instance, the 
name ROCHAMBEAU has the characteristic French ending -EAU; the French analysis of this name therefore 
receives a bonus. These rule-based scores complement the analogy-based scores. and enable the system to 
decide among competing pronunciations of a name even in the absence of a case library, albeit in a less 
informed way. 
Table 3 
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Positive analogies for transcription perators ofthe German and Generic analyses of KEIDEL 
OP 
(a) German analysis 
Analogy Score OP 
(b) Generic analysis 
Analogy score 
K:k 
EI:ay 
DA 
E:eh 
L:l 
KILLER -+ KEIDEL 0.67 
SPEJDEL-+ K~DEL 0.67 
SPEIIJEL --+ KEIIJI~L 0.91 
VOGEL --. KEIDEL 0.73 
GEIBEL -+ KEIDEL 0.91 
Transcription score: 0.76 
K:k 
EI:iy 
D:d 
E:e 
L:l 
KEELER --+ &~DEL 0.88 
R&ID-KEDEL 0.00 
RIEQEL -+ KEIQEL 0.71 
RIEDEL -+ KEIDEL 0.86 
RIEDEL- KEIDEL 0.88 
TranscriI%ion score: 0.56 
better on transcription operators is that the Generic analysis had little support for its 
EI:iy operator; REID was used, but scored poorly due to its global dissimilarity from 
KEIDEL. The name RIEDEL, while valuable elsewhere in the Generic analysis, could not 
help with EI:iy, because its I and E are in the wrong order. One other point concerns 
the E:eh operator in the German analysis: this operator was applied by analogy, not by 
a rule; thus there are no positive exemplars on which to base its score. Instead, the score 
of such an operator is taken to be the similarity score of the analogy that suggested 
it-in this case, the VOGELKEIDEL analogy. 
4. Evaluation 
Anapron’s performance was evaluated in three phases. The goal of the first phase 
was to gain a quantitative understanding of system performance: a profile was taken 
of how active each part of the system was in practice, and any deviations from the 
expected performance were analyzed. The second phase stepped back from this internal 
analysis of the system and looked at the “bottom line”: how does the performance 
of the rule/case hybrid approach, as embodied in Anapron, compare to that of other 
approaches? Commercial systems, other research systems, and humans were included 
in the comparison. Once the overall performance of Anapron was ascertained, the third 
phase was to understand how it achieved this performance, by evaluating the contribution 
of each of its components. This involved systematically modifying each component, and 
measuring the impact on system performance. The sections below discuss the three 
phases. 
4.1. Exploratory measurements 
Exploratory measurements of Anapron were taken to get a quantitative picture of its 
operation, and to detect any deviations from the expected behavior. Two main findings 
emerged: (1) the system found fewer strong analogies for rare names than for common 
names, although the total number of analogies, strong or weak, remained constant; and 
(2) the system’s criterion for analogical compellingness was too strict. The sections 
below present the test set that the exploratory measurements were based on, and the 
measurements that were made, together with the resulting findings. The measurements 
are grouped by whether they were purely objective, or included a subjective compo- 
nent. 
4.1.1. Test set 
The test set for this and the other experiments was drawn from the Donnelley corpus, 
a database of over 1.5 million distinct surnames covering 72 million households in the 
US. Names in Donnelley range from extremely common (e.g., SMITH, which occurs 
in over 670.000 households) to cxtremcly rare (e.g.. BOURIMAV~NG, which occurs in 
1 household). The number of households that have a particular name will be referred 
to as the ,freyuency (of occurrence 1 of the name. 
Test sets were constructed from Donnelley by selecting points of interest along the 
frequency spectrum, and randomly sampling an appropriate number of names at each 
point. If Donnelley had fewer than the desired number of names at some frequency 
f. then the names were selected randomly from the narrowest symmetric frequency 
band around f that was big enough. The test set for the objective measurements con- 
tains 13 exponentially distributed frequencies: I. 2,4,8,. ,4096. The frequencies were 
distributed exponentially because this yields evenly spaced measurements of Anapron’s 
behavior-this was determined in a pilot study, which showed that Anapron’s percentage 
of acceptable pronunciations drops linearly as frequency is decreased exponentially. The 
test set has a total of 10,000 names, with between 2.50 and 1000 at each frequency. 
These numbers represent a tradeoff between the cost of running the test, and the size 
of the confidence intervals in the resulting measurements. The names were chosen to 
be disjoint from Anapron’s dictionary, since names pronounceable by rote lookup are 
unrepresentative of system behavior. 
4.1.2. Objective ttteasurertmts 
Objective measurements were made for both the rule-based and case-based parts of the 
system. The rule-based measurements counted how many operators were applied by each 
module--language, morphology, transcription, syllable structure, and stress assignment. 
The case-based measurements counted how many analogies were proposed, accepted, 
and rejected, and for what reason, where the reason corresponds to the way the analogy 
satisfied or failed to satisfy the compellingness predicate. All measurements were broken 
down by name frequency, to see how the system’s behavior changes as the names get 
rarer and thus more difficult to pronounce. 
The main finding from the objective measurements was an effect termed the atuzlog- 
ical decline. It says that as name frequency decreases, the number of highly plausible 
analogies to the name decreases. where a highly plausible analogy is one with a very 
high similarity score (this notion will be made more precise below). Fig. 10 shows the 
transcription data on which the analogical decline is based. It plots the number of tran- 
scription analogies as a function of name frequency. It is split into two graphs-one for 
accepted analogies, and one for rejected analogies. The accepted analogies in turn are 
broken down into two reasons for acceptance, denoted significant, and highly plausible. 
These correspond to which of the two disjuncts the analogy satisfies in the last clause 
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of the definition of compellingness. ” The definition of compellingness is repeated here 
for convenience: 
Compelling-p(d) u 
similarity-score(d) 2 SSe 
and accuracy (A) 2 A0 
and (significance(d) 3 SO or similarity-score(d) 3 SS+) . 
Since highly plausible analogies match the last disjunct of this definition, they can now 
be seen to be those compelling analogies whose similarity score is KS+ or greater. 
Rejected analogies, like the accepted analogies, are broken down into two groups, this 
time for the two reasons for rejection: inaccurate, and unsupported. These correspond to 
whether the analogy failed to satisfy the second or third conjunct of compellingness. I2 
To test for upward or downward trends in these curves, a Spearman rank-correlation 
test [ lo] was run on each. The results were that the curve of highly plausible analogies 
was found to decrease (p(rS) < 0.01, p(D) < O.Ol), but no other significant trend 
was found. This means that the system found fewer highly plausible analogies for rare 
names. Note, however, that this does not mean that case-based reasoning is useless for 
rare names-it is merely less effective at finding highly plausible analogies. In fact, the 
number of “normal plausibility” analogies does not decrease significantly, as demon- 
strated by the absence of a decreasing trend in the curve of significant analogies, which 
counts all accepted analogies other than highly plausible ones. A further investigation 
of the analogical decline can be found in Golding [ 141. 
4.1.3. Subjective measurements 
Subjective measurements of the system’s behavior were made not on the lO,OOO-name 
test set described above, but on a scaled-down lOOO-name version. This was necessary 
to make it feasible to obtain human judgements. The lOOO-name test set had 250 names 
at each of four (roughly) exponentially distributed frequencies: 1, 32, 256, and 2048. 
The subjective measurements consisted of judgements, for each name, about the 
acceptability of the following: the overall pronunciation, the individual transcription and 
stress operators applied, the choice of language/morphology analysis, and the analogies 
proposed (whether accepted or rejected). The judgements were made by the first author. 
To facilitate this rather laborious process, a judgement editor was used, which provided 
a graphical user interface for entering or changing judgements about a name. The editor 
also verified that the judgements for a name were complete and consistent. 
” Analogies matching both disjuncts are counted as highly plausible-this reflects the system’s processing of 
such analogies. After looking at their similarity score and accuracy, the system declares them compelling for 
reason of high plausibility. It has no reason to check further whether they are also significant. 
I2 Analogies that fail to satisfy both conjuncts are counted as inaccurate, again because this can be determined 
from the similarity score and accuracy, without having to test whether they are unsupported. Also, there is 
technically a third reason for rejection, implausible, for analogies that have a similarity score less than S&i, 
and thus fail to satisfy the first conjunct of compellingness. Most implausible analogies are never generated by 
Anapron; the system has been optimized to not retrieve the very distant analogs that would give rise to such 
analogies. Consequently, implausible analogies cannot be accurately counted, and arc omitted from Fig. 10. 
()_I_ (II 
4096 1024 256 64 16 4 I 4096 1024 256 64 16 4 I 
Name frequent) Name frequency 
( a) Accepted analogies. I h ) Rejected analogies 
Fig. IO. Number of transcription analogies as a function of name frequency. Each of the four curves plots 
the number of analogies that were accepted or rejected for a particular reason. The number of names at each 
frequency has been scaled to 1000. 
The main result of the subjective measurements was that errors of analogical omis- 
sion (helpful analogies that were missed) were found to greatly outnumber errors 
of analogical commission (harmful analogies drawn). This suggests that the system’s 
analogical compellingness criterion may have been too strict. This could be fixed by 
lowering the system’s thresholds. ” thereby relaxing the compellingness criterion, or by 
re-working the similarity metrics to allow better discrimination between good and bad 
analogies. 
In the second phase of the evaluation, Anapron was compared with a variety of 
other name-pronunciation systems to see how the performance of the rule/case hybrid 
method compares with that of alternative approaches. Seven other systems were used in 
the comparison: three state-of-the-art commercial systems, two versions of a machine- 
learning system (NETtalk), and two humans. The commercial systems are the same 
ones mentioned earlier (see the beginning of Section 3): the OratorTM system from 
Bellcore and DECvoice from DEC, both of which are rule based, and TTS from Bell 
Labs, which is case based. The two versions of NETtalk are BP-legal, which is the 
vanilla version of NETtalk [ 331, and BP-block, which is NETtalk enhanced with a 
block-decoding postprocessor [ II]. The sections below sketch the test set, design, and 
results of the experiment. A more complete presentation can be found in Golding and 
Rosenbloom [ 161. 
4.2.1. Test set 
The test set for the system comparison was similar to that used in the subjective mea- 
surements, except that: ( I) only 100 names (not 2.50) were chosen at each frequency, 
” The results of the threshold modification study suggest that the most effective threshold to lower would be 
.S&: see Section 4.3. 
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to reduce the burden on the human test subjects; and (2) the test set was no longer 
constrained to be disjoint from Anapron’s dictionary, as an unbiased measurement of 
system performance includes names both in and out of the dictionary. 
4.2.2. Design 
Because there is no objective criterion of correctness for name pronunciations, a 
pronunciation was evaluated by asking human test subjects whether they found it ac- 
ceptable. Each system was run on the 400~name test set described above. The output 
of the computer systems was collected in the form of written pronunciations; the output 
of the human pronouncers was tape-recorded and transcribed as written pronunciations. 
The two versions of NETtalk were trained on Anapron’s 5000~name pronouncing dic- 
tionary. 
A cassette tape was made of the pronunciations generated by all systems. This in- 
volved, for each name, eliminating duplicate pronunciations, and permuting the remain- 
ing pronunciations randomly. The order of names in the test set was permuted randomly 
as well. To hide the identities of the systems, all pronunciations were read by the 
DECtalk speech synthesizer. A panel of 14 human test subjects listened to the cassette 
tape and rated the acceptability of each pronunciation. 
4.2.3. Results 
The main results of the system comparison appear in Fig. 11. The names of the 
commercial systems and humans have been omitted as their identities are not relevant 
here. The figure gives the percentage of acceptable scores, out of a total of 5600, awarded 
to each system (5600= 14 judges x 400 pronunciations). The scores are broken down 
by name frequency. The figure includes an imaginary ninth system, labelled Ubound, 
which generates for each name the pronunciation that received the greatest number of 
acceptable votes from the judges. It measures the degree to which all judges can be 
pleased simultaneously, using just the pronunciations available from the eight systems 
tested. 
Fig. 11 shows that Anapron performs almost at the level of the commercial systems, 
and substantially better than the two versions of NETtalk. Also, although the eight 
systems seem to hit a performance asymptote at 93%, the Ubound system demonstrates 
that it is possible to score at least 97%. This suggests that there is room for improvement 
in all systems. 
To detect whether the differences between Anapron and the other systems were statis- 
tically significant, an ANOVA was run, followed up by a Bonferroni multiple comparison 
procedure. The results are shown in Fig. 11 as annotations on the scores in the table. 
Overall, Anapron outperformed the two versions of NETtalk, but the commercial sys- 
tems, humans, and Ubound did better than Anapron. However, in some frequency ranges, 
a significant difference between Anapron and certain commercial systems could not be 
detected. 
Given that Anapron is able to exploit two knowledge sources, while the other com- 
puter systems use just one, it may be surprising that Anapron did not outperform the 
commercial systems. It should be borne in mind, however, that Anapron’s knowledge 
sources were put together as rapidly as possible from whatever rules and cases could 
System Name frequency Overall 
3048 
UhCWiId 98 + 
Human I 07 + 
Human2 9x + 
corn I 97 + 
Con12 96 + 
Con13 96 + 
Anapron 91 
BP-block 81 - 
BP-legal 78 - 
256 ?2 
98 + 98 + 
93 t 9.3 + 
94 + 94 i 
95 + c)? i 
90 +? 87 i ‘) 
94 i- 8’) C 
88 85 
83- 77 
72 66 
Fig. I I. Percentage of acceptable scores fat- each sys~ern. broken down by name frequency. The data are 
shown as a table and as a graph. Scores in the table have a plus sign (+) if higher than Anapron’s score, or a 
minus sign (-) if lower. Ail differences are aignilicant at the 0.01 level, except those marked with a question 
mark ( ?), which are not significant even at the 0. IO level ‘The humans were omitted from the graph to avoid 
clutter: their curves would lie between those of Ubound and Corn?. The curve for BP-legal was truncated 
when it ran off the bottom of the graph 
be obtained-basically the MITalk rules and a WOO-name pronouncing dictionary. The 
commercial systems, in contrast, use extremely high-quality, and unfortunately propri- 
etary, knowledge sources-carefully tuned rule sets for the rule-based systems, and a 
dictionary of over 40,000 names for the cast-based system. Anapron was in fact found 
to improve on the performance of its rules or cases alone (see Section 4.3); it would 
appear, however, that in the system comparison, this improvement was outweighed by 
the mediocre quality of the rules and cases used. Thus while Anapron provides a proof 
of concept of the architecture-a demonstration that combining rules and cases improves 
performance-actually using this improvement to outperform commercial systems must 
wait until such time as commercial-quality knowledge sources can be obtained for test- 
ing. 
4.3. Mod~ficution studies 
To gauge the contribution 01’ Anapron’s components to its overall performance, a set of 
experiments was performed in which various components were modified, and the effects 
on system performance were observed. Five such studies were run, modifying: rules and 
cases, thresholds. language knowledge. morphology knowledge, and syllable-structure 
knowledge. The first study-on rules and cases-directly investigated the effects of 
combining rule-based and case-based reasoning. It provided the key result that the system 
achieved higher accuracy by combining rules and cases than it could have achieved with 
either one alone. The threshold study tested how sensitive the system’s performance was 
to the threshold settings used in the definition of analogical compellingness-i.e., SSe, 
SS,, A(), and Se. Extreme raising or lowering of any one threshold was generally found 
to hurt accuracy, although lowering SSo sometimes improved accuracy at the expense 
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of increasing run time. The remaining three studies concerned the system’s support 
knowledge-i.e., knowledge needed in support of the two top-level tasks, transcription 
and stress. Degrading the language or morphology knowledge sufficiently was found 
to have a substantial negative impact on system accuracy, while degrading syllable- 
structure knowledge had a relatively minor effect. These studies are described more 
fully in Golding [ 141. 
The rule/case modification study [ 151 is the subject of the rest of this section, The 
test set, design, and results are discussed below. 
4.3.1. Test set 
Like the system comparison, the rule/case experiment required a great deal of human 
effort in the evaluation. The test set was therefore made the same size as in the system 
comparison-100 names at each of four frequencies. The only difference was that, as in 
the exploratory measurements, the test set was constrained to be disjoint from Anapron’s 
dictionary, since again rote lookup behaviors were not of interest. 
4.3.2. Design 
The rule/case study involved independently varying the strength of the system’s rules 
and cases. For each combination of rule strength and case strength, the system was 
run on the 400-name test set, and its accuracy and run time were recorded. Accuracy 
was measured as the proportion of acceptable pronunciations generated by the system, 
where acceptability was judged by the first author. I4 All judgements were cached and 
re-used if a pronunciation recurred, to help enforce consistency across trials. Run time 
was the average time, in seconds, for the system to pronounce a name in the test set. 
The system, written in CommonLisp, was run on a Texas Instruments Microexplorer 
with 8M memory. 
The rules were set to four different strengths: 0, l/3, 213, and 1. A strength of 1 
means all transcription and stress rules were retained in the system. Strength 0 means 
that all rules were deleted except default rules. The default rules transcribe a letter or 
assign stress if no other more specific rule matches. The default rules cannot be deleted, 
otherwise the system would be unable to generate a complete pronunciation for some 
names. Retaining the default rules corresponds to keeping 137 of the 619 transcription 
rules and 16 of the 29 stress rules. Rule strengths between 0 and 1 correspond to retaining 
a proportional number of nondefault rules in the system. Each strength is obtained by 
deleting a random subset of the nondefault rules from the next higher strength. 
The cases were set to six strengths: 0, 1000,2000,3000,4000, and 5000. The strength 
is just the number of names that were kept in the case library. Again, each weakening 
of the case library produces an arbitrary subset of the previous case library. 
4.3.3. Accuracy results 
Fig. 12 shows system accuracy as a function of both rule strength and case strength. 
The main result is that accuracy improves monotonically as rule or case strength in- 
I4 The first author was an unusually harsh judge, thus the scores here are not directly comparable to those of 
the system comparison. 
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Fig. 12. System accuracy, shown as a table and as a 3D graph. Each value is the percentage of names in the 
test set for which the system produced an acceptable pronunciation. 
Kule Case strength ( x 1000) 
strength 0 I 2 3 3 5 A r. 
I I .3 3.0 4.1 5.2 6.3 7.2 :, ‘-3 
213 1.2 3.1 4.4 5.8 72 X.5 \ 
l/3 1.1 3.0 4.4 5.9 7.6 93 @ 
0 0.9 3.0 4.5 6.3 8.2 IO.2 0 1 . ..., 
,I’ ” Rules 
cases .. , ..,;/ 
Fig. 13. System run time, shown as a table and a:, A 3D graph. E&h value is the average time (in seconds) 
for the system to pronounce a name in the test set 
creases. The total improvement in accuracy due to adding rules is between 32% and 
38% of the test set (depending on case strength). For cases it is between 12% and 17% 
(depending on rule strength). This shows that rules and cases each contribute to the 
system’s overall accuracy. It is only by having both knowledge sources that the system 
is able to achieve its best performance. 
4.3.4. Run-time results 
Fig. 13 gives the results on run time. The interesting point here is that when the case 
library is large, adding rules to the system actually decreases run time. For example, 
with the case library at size 5000, increasing the rules from strength 0 to 1 lowers run 
time from 10.2 to 7.2 seconds per name. The reason is that adding rules to the system 
improves the overall accuracy of the rules, barring sociopathic effects. When the rules 
are more accurate, they will have fewer exceptions. This translates into fewer negative 
exemplars, and thus fewer opportunities to draw analogies. The foregone analogies result 
in a corresponding savings in run time. In short, adding rules to the system reduces the 
load on the CBR component. This demonstrates that RBR and CBR do not merely exist 
side by side in the architecture: they interact beneficially. 
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RBRICBR Hybrids 
Efficiency-improving Accuracy-improving 
Cases derived 
from rules 
. CASEY 
l PRODIGY I 
ANALOGY 
Rules derived 
from cases 
l Quinlan 
and Rivest 
. DAEDALUS 
Emphasis on 
invocation 
. CABARET 
. GREBE 
. IKBALS II 
l FRANK 
Emphasis on 
combination 
I 
Weak Knowledge-based 
method method 
l CELIA 
l Quinlan 
Per-case Similarity + Similarity t
knowledge meta-knowledge other cases 
. MARS . DANIEL l ANAPRON 
Fig. 14. Taxonomy of methods for combining RBR and CBR. Examples of systems that use each method are 
listed at the leaf nodes. 
5. Related work 
A number of other methods have been proposed for combining RBR and CBR. Each 
method is designed around a particular set of knowledge requirements; for instance, 
some methods expect independent rules and cases, while others start with just one 
knowledge source and derive the other from it. Methods also differ in their approach 
to integrating rules and cases; some focus on how and when RBR and CBR can each 
be profitably invoked, while others concentrate on how to reconcile conflicting results 
of RBR and CBR. Fig. 14 organizes the methods into a hierarchy according to these 
differences. 
The first branching point tests whether the rules and cases used by the method are 
dependent or independent. If the rules and cases are dependent, it means that one was 
derived from the other. Such methods are labelled as efficiency-improving; their primary 
motivation is to express their knowledge in whatever form will make problem solving 
most efficient. The methods with independent rules and cases are labelled as accuracy- 
improving; the primary motivation here is to maximize problem-solving accuracy by 
exploiting multiple knowledge sources. 
The efficiency-improving methods can be further broken down according to which 
of their knowledge sources was derived from which. Most CBR systems that include a 
rule component have cases that are derived from their rules. The cases are records of 
how the rules were applied to particular examples encountered previously. By reasoning 
from cases, the systems bypass the potentially lengthy process of solving a new problem 
from scratch via the rules. For example, CASEY [22] works in the domain of heart- 
i’ailure diagnosis. It has a complete but slow set of rules-in the form of a causal 
model-for diagnosing heart failures. When given a new case to diagnose, it tries to 
relate the case to a similar case diagnosed previously. When it can find such a case, 
its answer usually agrees with what the causal model would have said, but is obtained 
an average of two orders of magnitude faster. PRODIGY/ANALOGY [ 361 can be 
regarded as a general architecture ii>r combining RBR and CBR to improve efficiency. 
PRODIGY/ANALOGY’s equivalent of rule-based reasoning is problem solving via 
search; its version of case-based reasoning is derivational analogy [ 8 I. 
The systems whose rules are derived from their cases extract the rules by some 
generalization procedure. The systems must still keep the cases around, because their 
rules do not encode all of the knowledge in the cases. The rules in these systems can 
serve various purposes, such as enabling a more compact representation of the data, 
as in Quinlan and Rivest 12X], or providin, (7 more efficient access IO the cases, as in 
Daedalus 12 j. 
Systems utilizing independent rules and cases are much closer in spirit to Anapron. 
Again the systems fall into two groups. The first group emphasizes how and when to 
ia~oke the RBR and CBR components: the second group emphasizes how to combirze 
the results once the components have been invoked. 
Systems that emphasize invocation include CABARET [ 32 1, GREBE [ 4 J , IKBALS II 
[39], and FRANK [ 31 1. These systems are designed to gather evidence to support a 
user‘s position. CABARET, GREBE. and IKBALS II work in the domain of legal 
reasoning. finding su pport for one side or the other in a legal case. FRANK has been 
applied to the task of diagnosing hack injuries. and generates medical reports reflecting 
the uscr’k expository goals (c.g.. downplay the seriousness of the injury: or give a 
balanced account of the evidence). Because these systems are not intended to make an 
actual decision about whether the user’s position is right or wrong, they do not have to 
resolve conflicts between RBR and CBR; they merely report all of the evidence. The 
effort in these systems therefore goes not into combining the results of RBR and CBR, 
but into determining when RBR and CBR can each be profitably invoked to contribute 
to the target problem. CABARET uses a set of heuristics for this purpose, such as “If 
a rule fires with an undesired conclusion, invoke CBR to find cases that discredit the 
rule”. GREBE uses a control strategy that calls on CBR to operationalize abstract rule 
antecedents, and calls on RBR to establish and elaborate matches between a source and 
target case. IKBALS II starts with the rules. only invoking CBR when it encounters 
an open-textured term that cannot be interpreted by further rule chaining. FRANK uses 
blackboard-based opportunistic control to select the most appropriate reasoning method 
to apply to a particular subgoal. 
In the second group of systems, the locus is on reconciling the conclusions of RBR and 
CBR. The reconciliation can be done either hy a weak method-i.e., a general-purpose 
method that does not require knowledge of the domain-or a knowledge-based method. 
CELIA [ 29 1 and Quinlan’s method 127) are two examples of using a weak method. 
CELIA is a learning apprentice in the domain of automobile repair. A central part of the 
system’s function as a learning apprentice is to watch an expert mechanic and predict 
the expert’s next step. Prediction is done using two knowledge sources: abstract general 
knowledge, and cases. The abstract general knowledge is that of a novice mechanic, 
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and is thus assumed incomplete and buggy. The cases, in contrast, represent actual 
troubleshooting sequences by an expert, and are considered highly reliable. To predict 
the expert’s next step, CELIA applies its buggy model, and, independently, looks for 
an analogous case on which to base its prediction. If it is able to come up with a 
prediction based on a case, it listens to it, else it falls back on the rule-based prediction. 
This illustrates a way of integrating abstract general knowledge and cases under the 
assumption of incomplete, buggy general knowledge. It is a weak method because it 
does not use domain knowledge to decide between rules and cases, but rather simply 
prefers cases whenever they are applicable. 
Quinlan’s method [27] applies to tasks whose answer is a numeric quantity. It uses 
an instance-based scheme to generate an initial answer; this step corresponds to CBR. 
The simplest instance-based scheme is to retrieve the source case that is closest (by 
some metric) to the target, and just copy its answer. Quinlan’s method improves on this 
answer by using a model, M, to add a correction term; this step corresponds to RBR. Let: 
. T= the target problem, 
0 s= the source case retrieved by the instance-based scheme, 
l A(S) = the answer given by the source case, 
l M(T) = the answer obtained by applying the model to the target, 
l M(S) = the answer obtained by applying the model to the source. 
The pure instance-based scheme would give the answer A(S). But Quinlan’s combined 
method gives A(S) + ( M(T) - M ( S) ) . The parenthesized correction term helps account 
for differences between the source and target problems. This answer is thus obtained 
numerically from the results of RBR and CBR; no domain knowledge is needed. 
Systems that take a knowledge-based approach to combining the results of RBR and 
CBR include Anapron, MARS [ 121, and DAMEL [ 61. The main distinction among 
these systems is in the type of knowledge they use to do the combination. MARS 
combines evidence from multiple rules and cases using possibilistic reasoning. This 
requires that all of its knowledge be represented as possibilistic rules; thus MARS’s first 
step is to convert its cases into this form. The conversion requires certain knowledge 
about each case: the features of the case that are relevant to its outcome, and the 
necessity and sufficiency with which this outcome is implied. This per-case knowledge 
enables MARS to represent each case as a rule and subsequently aggregate evidence 
from rules and cases via possibilistic reasoning. In MARS’s domain of mergers and 
acquisitions, the per-case knowledge is acquired via natural-language processing of a 
document that explains the judge’s ruling on each case. 
DANIEL combines CBR and RBR for legal interpretation. DANIEL explicitly ad- 
dresses conflicts between rules and cases by invoking a rule-based coordination corn- 
ponent. This component decides between CBR and RBR using two sources: domain 
meta-knowledge-in particular, the legal binding force of the rule-based and case-based 
arguments, and the degree of open-texturedness of the predicates involved-and the 
similarity between the source and target cases. 
In Anapron, decisions between RBR and CBR are based on the compellingness of 
the analogy. Compellingness depends on two factors: the similarity between source and 
target, and an empirical verification, which tests the generalization behind the analogy 
on other cases in the case library. 
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It can be seen that MARS, DANIEL, and Anapron each depend on different kinds of 
knowledge to arbitrate between RBR and CBR. The systems are therefore applicable in 
different situations: when it is practical to do the knowledge engineering of cases that 
MARS requires, MARS is appropriate. When domain meta-knowledge is available for 
evaluating the strength of a case-based or rule-based argument, and when it is practical 
to specify a similarity metric, DANIEL is appropriate. When a large supply of cases is 
available for testing out an analogy, and again when a similarity metric can be specified, 
Anapron is appropriate. 
6. Conclusion 
An architecture was presented for improving system accuracy by bringing together 
knowledge in two forms: rules and cases. The architecture is intended for domains that 
are understood well but not perfectly. The idea is that in such domains, expert knowledge 
in the form of rules can be used to provide a skeletal method for solving problems; 
cases are then used to flesh out the method by covering idiosyncrasies and special cases 
that were not anticipated by the rules. In addition to a reasonably accurate and efficient 
set of rules to serve as a starting point for problem solving, the architecture also needs 
knowledge in support of CBR-namely, a set of cases and a similarity metric. The set 
of cases should be extensive enough to illustrate the errors in the rules; any unillustrated 
problems cannot be corrected. 
The architecture was applied to the task of name pronunciation. With minimal knowl- 
edge engineering, it was found to perform almost at the level of state-of-the-art commer- 
cial systems. More importantly, a modification experiment showed that its performance 
was higher than what it could have achieved with its rules or cases alone. This demon- 
strates the capacity of the architecture to improve upon a pure rule-based or case-based 
system. In addition to the accuracy benefits, having rules together with the cases allowed 
two innovations in CBR technology: first, the rules provided a natural way to index the 
cases (prediction-based indexing); and second, they provided a method of doing case 
adaptation, termed “case adaptation by factoring”. 
The architecture presented here is one datapoint in a hierarchy of possible hybrid 
approaches. One way to abstract away from its design is to keep the same reasoning 
components (RBR and CBR), but to combine them differently. The method of combina- 
tion could be tailored to whatever knowledge is available in the domain, whether analytic 
(e.g., heuristics about when to believe RBR versus CBR) or empirical (e.g., examples 
of previous decisions combining RBR and CBR). Another way to abstract away from 
the architecture is to replace its RBR component with some other reasoning method. 
CBR then becomes a postprocessor to improve an approximate answer obtained by any 
method of choice. The downside, however, is that the benefits of having rules together 
with cases would be lost-alternative methods of case indexing and case adaptation 
would be needed. A final level of abstraction, and the one that is in fact the essence of 
the work presented here, is simply to combine multiple independent knowledge sources 
to achieve higher accuracy. 
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